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Abstract 
Our study has three objectives. The first is to determine the level of voluntary 
disclosure in Saudi Arabia. The second is to compare this level with that of some other 
Arab countries. The third is to identify the main drivers of voluntary disclosure in Saudi 
Arabia. We use a disclosure checklist of 54 items to measure levels of voluntary 
disclosure. We also use the ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis to test our 
hypotheses for a sample of 361 firm-year observations of firms listed on the Saudi Stock 
Exchange over the period 2007-2011.  
We find that the average voluntary disclosure level is 18.38%. This rate is the 
lowest rate among the other Arab countries studied; the rates ranged from 26.08% in 
Tunisia to 75.76% in Bahrain. This lowest rate of voluntary disclosure is not 
commensurate with the size of the Saudi economy which contributes 25% of the total 
Arab countries' GDP, and is the world's 25th largest exporter/importer. Our analysis also 
shows that firm size, firm age, firm profitability, auditor specialization, family 
ownership, and industry type positively affect voluntary disclosure. We find, however, a 
negative relation between firm leverage and voluntary disclosure. Our analysis also 
shows that board independence, Big 4 and state ownership have no impact on voluntary 
disclosure. Our findings should be of interest to the regulating bodies, accounting 
standards’ setters, auditors and managers. These findings should help in recognizing the 
main drivers of voluntary disclosure and in setting appropriate policies in relation to 
voluntary disclosure, and hence, encourage firms to disseminate more information 
voluntarily. 
 
Keywords: Voluntary Disclosure, firm characteristics, corporate governance; Saudi 
Arabia 
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1. Introduction  
In the business environment, companies are required to disclose minimum levels of 
information, which is known as mandatory disclosure; if not, they will face sanctions. 
Therefore, almost all companies comply fully with the minimum levels of the mandatory 
disclosure (Hassan et al., 2009). However, the current business era makes compliance with 
this mandatory disclosure neither adequate nor suitable to meet the corporate information 
users’ needs. This raises an urgent need for extra information than is required; this extra 
information is known as the voluntary disclosure. 
Businesses in the current era face information challenges that they never met in the 
past. First, the current age is the information age, in which information has become a 
crucial influencer. In other words, any piece of information may make a crucial change to 
the users’ investment decisions; therefore, the present limited mandatory information is not 
sufficient. Second, the separation of the companies' ownership and management creates 
what is known as the information asymmetry problem. Traditionally, annual reports are 
used to minimize this information gap. Lev (1989), Wallace (1988), and Baker and Haslem 
(1973), however, argue that financial statements do not provide users with adequate 
information, which increases the information gap between information suppliers 
(managers) and information demanders (stakeholders). In addition, nowadays, the nature 
and extent of information demanded are both different and greater than in the past, which 
means that information asymmetry is larger than in the past. Therefore, to mitigate this 
problem, companies need to voluntarily disclose more information. Third, recent decades 
have witnessed financial scandals resulting in the collapse of long-lived companies. We 
believe that one of the main reasons for these collapses is the concealing and non-
disclosure of relevant information, although the failed companies have been found to 
comply completely with the minimum levels of mandatory disclosure. Consequently, the 
need for voluntary disclosure has increased.  
In order to cope with the information challenges in the current business era, 
companies are encouraged by the regulating and accounting bodies, pressured by the 
stakeholders, and directed by the market, to disclose more information than is required. In 
addition, the regulating bodies have started to set regulations and provide guidelines to 
help companies provide an effective level of voluntary disclosure. For example, a business 
reporting research project released by FASB in 2001, entitled “Insights into Enhancing 
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Voluntary Disclosure”, provides guidelines for managers to increase the amount and 
quality of voluntary disclosure. 
Our paper aims to find answers for the following questions: (1) what is the extent 
of voluntary disclosure in Saudi Arabia?; (2) what is position of Saudi Arabia compared to 
other Arab countries, based on the extent of voluntary disclosure?; and (3) what are the 
main determinants of voluntary disclosure in the Saudi Arabia? 
Saudi Arabia provides a unique country context for a number of reasons. First, the 
Saudi Arabia is an Arab emerging country that is different in religious, social and political 
systems and traditions from developed countries. For example, Islamic principles affect the 
daily life, business, law, economics and political aspects of the Saudi society. Further, 
Saudi Arabia has applied a corporate governance code in 2007; this code is affected 
significantly by the Islamic principles that resulted in introducing Islamic governance 
characteristics (Albassam, 2014). Second, the economy of Saudi Arabia is a leading in the 
Arab region, where it represented 25% of the total Arab GDP and 44% of total Arab 
market capitalization in 2010 (Albassam, 2014; Alshehri & Solomon, 2012). Further, 
Saudi Arabia holds one quarter of the world’s oil reserves and is one of the largest oil 
producers in OPEC, about 31% of the total OPEC production in 2010 (Albassam, 2014). 
Third, the ownership structure in Saudi Arabia is family and state-concentrated, where 
family-owned firms represent more than 70% of listed firms and Saudi government owns 
more than 30% of listed firms (Albassam, 2014; Baydoun, et al. 2013; ROSC, 2009). All 
these aspects motivate us to examine the determinant s of voluntary disclosure in Saudi 
Arabia, an area that remains really under-researched. 
Our analysis shows that the average voluntary disclosure level in Saudi Arabia is 
18.38%. This is the lowest rate of the countries studied; these range from 26.08% in 
Tunisia to 75.76% in Bahrain. This lowest rate is not commensurate with the size of the 
Saudi Arabian size. Our analysis also shows that firm size, firm age, firm profitability, 
auditor specialization, family ownership, and industry type positively affect voluntary 
disclosure. We find, however, a negative relation between firm leverage and voluntary 
disclosure. Our analysis also shows that board independence, Big 4 and state ownership 
have no impact on voluntary disclosure.  
To the best of our knowledge, only two studies examine the drivers of voluntary 
disclosure in Saudi Arabia; namely, Al-Janadi et al. (2013) and Alsaeed (2006). Our paper 
5 
 
makes major contributions to research on voluntary disclosure in Saudi Arabia as follows: 
First, we use a recent and longer period  (2007-2011) than Al-Janadi et al. (2013) which 
cover the period 2002-2003, and Alsaeed (2006) which covers the period 2006-2007. 
Second, Al-Janadi et al. (2013) investigate the corporate governance impact on voluntary 
disclosure, while Alsaeed (2006) examines the impact of firm characteristics on voluntary 
disclosure. Our study investigates the impact of both corporate governance mechanisms 
and firm characteristics on voluntary disclosure. Third, our study covers a larger number of 
firm-year observations (361), compared with 87 and 40 by other two studies. Finally, we 
use a comprehensive disclosure index consisting of 54 disclosure items; while the indices 
used in the two prior studies consist of only 20 and 21 disclosure items.  
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discussed the theoretical framework 
and relevant literature. Section 3 discusses the development of the hypotheses. Section 4 
discusses the methodology. Section 5 discusses the findings. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  Theories and Literature Review 
 
2.1 Theories explaining the voluntary disclosure variance 
Disclosure studies show wide variances in nature and extent of voluntary disclosure 
across firms within the same industry and country. Some firms are found to voluntarily 
disclose large amounts of information, while others do not disclose any more. Accounting 
Researchers around the world examine the potential determinants of disclosure extensively 
and provide many theories to explain the voluntary disclosure variance. These theories 
include agency theory; legitimacy theory; signaling theory; capital need theory and 
stakeholder theory. 
Agency theory postulates that companies tend to disclose more information 
voluntarily in order to reduce the agency costs that arise from conflicts between managers 
and stockholders (Alves, 2012; Zayoud et al., 2011; Watson et al., 2002; Lambert, 2001). 
Legitimacy theory argues that firms have a social contract with society, and therefore, 
firms provide greater levels of voluntary disclosure in order to ensure that they comply 
with the ethics and regulations of that society, as mandatory disclosure may be insufficient 
(Bazine & Vural, 2011; Rizk, 2006; Guthrie et al., 2004). Signaling theory proposes that 
firms with large levels of voluntary disclosure intend to reduce the information asymmetry 
and signal the quality and real value of firms by providing more information to parties who 
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lack information (Bazine & Vural, 2011; Morris, 1987; Ross, 1977). Capital need theory 
suggests that firms resort to disclosing more information voluntarily when they need to 
raise more funds whether from banks or financial markets (Meek et al. 1995; Hossain et al. 
1994). Stakeholders’ theory assumes that firms should satisfy and meet the interests and 
the information needs of all stakeholders rather than only the shareholders (Abdel-Fattah, 
2008). This theory expects also that large firms are more likely to provide more voluntary 
information because of the greater stress of large number of stakeholders. We use these 
theories in developing our research hypotheses. 
 
2.2 The Literature Review 
 
We review relevant literature that examines the voluntary disclosure in developing 
countries. Using the Egyptian context, Soliman (2013) examines the association between 
certain firm characteristics and the extent of voluntary disclosure. He finds that firm size 
and profitability are positively associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure, while 
auditor size and firm age do not have any significant association. Samaha and Dahawy 
(2011) find that the overall voluntary disclosure level by Egyptian firms was low 
(13.43%). They also find a positive association between the ratio of independent directors 
on the board, profitability and internationality and voluntary disclosure level. However, 
managerial and governmental ownerships, number of shareholders, auditor type, size, 
liquidity, leverage and industry type were found not to affect the voluntary disclosure 
level. Abdel-Fattah (2008) finds that that although the voluntary disclosure level found to 
be low, there was a gradual increase in the extent of total voluntary disclosure among 
Egyptian firms over the study years 2003-2006. Furthermore, the findings indicate that 
board size and board composition do affect the extent of voluntary disclosure.  Hassan et 
al. (2006) find that the sample firms publish 90%, on average, of the mandatory disclosure 
checklist items and 48%, on average, of the voluntary disclosure checklist items prepared 
by authors. The results show also a general increase in the disclosure levels over the study 
period 1995-2002. Moreover, public sector firms appear to disclose less information than 
private sector firms do.  Further, firms that are more profitable found to disclose more 
information than less profitable firms did and large firms found to disclose more voluntary 
disclosure and less mandatory disclosure.  
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Juhmani (2013) examines the association between three ownership structure 
variables and voluntary disclosure for a sample of 41 firms listed on Bahrain Stock 
Exchange in the year 2010. The results indicate a negative correlation between block-
holder ownership and voluntary disclosure, but there was no correlation found between 
managerial or governmental ownership and voluntary disclosure. In addition, size and 
leverage were included as control variables, and were found to be positively correlated 
with voluntary disclosure.  
Kolsi (2012) finds that Tunisian firm leverage, audit quality, financial sector and 
profitability ratio are significant determinants of voluntary disclosure, while ownership 
structure and firm size have no effect on voluntary disclosure. Htay (2012) finds that 
Malaysian firms with higher board size, a higher proportion of independent non-executive 
directors on the board, and a lower proportion of directors' ownership voluntarily disclose 
more financial accounting information.    
Alves et al. (2012) examine the association between corporate characteristics, and 
corporate governance variables and voluntary disclosure using a sample of 38 Portuguese 
and 102 Spanish firms in the year 2007. They find that firm size, growth opportunities, 
organizational performance, board compensation, and the existence of a large shareholder 
are the main determinants of voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, Bazine and Vural (2011) 
explore the influence of firm characteristics on voluntary disclosure for a sample of 149 
manufacturing firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange across 2001-2009. They find 
that firm size and industry type affect the extent of voluntary disclosure.  
Hossain and Hammami (2009) investigate the voluntary disclosure drivers in Qatar 
by analyzing annual reports of 25 firms listed on Doha Securities Market for the year 2007. 
The results indicate that firm age, size, complexity, and assets-in-place are significantly 
correlated with the voluntary disclosure index; however, the profitability variable was 
found to be insignificantly correlated. Aljifri (2008) examines annual reports of 31 UAE 
firms, for the year 2003. He finds significant differences among sectors, but finds 
insignificant correlation between size, debt-equity ratio, and profitability and voluntary 
disclosure. In addition, Barako (2007) examines the extent to which corporate governance 
traits, ownership structure, and corporate attributes affect voluntary disclosure for a sample 
of listed firms in Kenya during the period 1992-2001. The findings indicate a low level of 
voluntary disclosure; however, there is a gradual increase in voluntary disclosure during 
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the study period. Moreover, He finds that corporate governance traits, ownership structure, 
and corporate traits (i.e. corporate size and industry) affect voluntary disclosure.  
Using the Saudi context, we find only three relevant studies; two of them examine 
the drivers of voluntary disclosure, while the other one examines the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. First, Al-Janadi et al. (2013) examine the influence of internal and external 
corporate governance mechanisms on voluntary disclosure in Saudi Arabia. They collected 
data from the annual reports of 87 firms for 2006 and 2007 and constructed a disclosure 
index consisting of 21 items. The results indicate that non-executive directors, board size, 
CEO duality, audit quality and government ownership contribute positively to voluntary 
disclosure quality and extent.  
Second, Alsaeed (2006) examines the influence of specific variables on the 
voluntary disclosure using a sample of 40 firms listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange during 
the period 2002-2003. The results indicate that firm size is significantly and positively 
correlated with the level of the voluntary disclosure; however, the remaining variables, 
namely, debt, ownership dispersion, age, profit margin, return on equity, liquidity, audit 
type, and industry type have no significant correlation with the levels of voluntary 
disclosure.  
The third study conducted in Saudi Arabia is that of Mariq (2009), who examines 
only the nature and extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of a sample of 52 
firms listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange in the year 2005. A disclosure index consisting of 
60 items representing the basic items of voluntary disclosure is used. The results indicate 
that there is a large variance in the extent and nature of voluntary disclosure between the 
sample firms. However, the study finds a general tendency of firms to disclose voluntarily 
more information.  
Our study offers a number of contributions. First, to the best of our knowledge, we 
find only two studies that examine the drivers of voluntary disclosure in Saudi Arabia. Al-
Janadi et al. (2013) cover the year 2006-2007, while Alsaeed (2006) covers the years 2002-
2003. However, this study provides a more recent and longer period 2007-2011. Second, 
we find that Al-Janadi et al. (2013) focus mainly on the influence of corporate governance 
variables, while Alsaeed (2006) primarily examines the influence of corporate 
characteristics. Our study examines the impact of firm characteristics and corporate 
governance on voluntary disclosure. Third, the disclosure indices used in the two studies 
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consist of relatively low number of items (21 and 20). However, our study uses a 
disclosure index consisting of 54 disclosure items. Finally, the two studies analyze 
relatively small samples (87 & 40) firm-year observations. However, our study analyzes 
361 firm-year observations. Figure 1 categorizes the 30 variables that are studied in the 
disclosure literature as determinants of voluntary disclosure. We classify them into three 
main categories: board characteristics, corporate characteristics, and ownership structure. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
 
Firm Size  
Alves et al. (2012), Abdel-Fattah (2008), Brammer and Pavelin (2006), and Chow 
and Wong-Boren (1987), among others, argue that the larger the firm is the more likely 
they are to disclose more information voluntarily. The positive relationship between firm 
size and voluntary disclosure extent may be due to several reasons. First, large firms are 
more able to afford the additional voluntary disclosure costs than small firms. Second, in 
the context of stakeholders theory, large firms have more stakeholders pressurizing the 
management to disclose more information than do small firms. Third, large firms 
Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure 
Board Characteristics 
1- Board Size 
2- Dual Role 
3- Existence of 
Foreigners 
4- Existence of 
Family Members 
5- Non-executive 
Directors 
6- Board Audit 
Committee 
7- Board 
Compensation 
8- Board Expertise 
 
Ownership Structure 
1- Managerial 
Ownership 
2- State 
Ownership 
3- Institutional 
Ownership 
4- Block-Holder 
Ownership 
5- Foreign 
Ownership 
6- Family 
Ownership 
Corporate Characteristics 
1- Firm Size 
2- Firm Leverage 
3- Firm Profitability 
4- Firm Liquidity 
5- Industry Type 
6- Auditor Type 
7- Auditor Specialization 
8- Company Age 
9- Cross Listing 
10- Firm Growth 
11- Management 
Expertise 
12- Management 
Incentives  
13- Complexity of 
Business 
14- Assets Structure 
15- No. of Analysts 
Following the 
Company 
16- No. of Shareholders 
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encounter political costs to a greater extent than small firms; therefore, large firms work to 
reduce political costs through disclosing more information voluntarily (Abdel-Fattah, 
2008; Camfferman & Cooke, 2002; Watts & Zimmerman, 1990; Cooke, 1989). Based on 
these arguments, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relation between firms' size and voluntary disclosure. 
 
Firm Age  
There is a debate as to the level of influence of firms' age on voluntary disclosure. 
Sehar et al. (2013) argue that new firms disclose more information voluntarily than do old 
ones. However, Hossain (2008) documents that it is not possible to conclude that the older 
firms disclose more information than do new firms. Furthermore, Owusu-Ansah (1998) 
argues that a considerable portion of the new firms' information is related to research and 
development, and expenditure; therefore, these firms can encounter a competitive 
disadvantage if they fail to disclose such information. In this regard, this study argues that 
new firms lack the financial resources and expertise to organize and disseminate more 
information than is required and these firms prioritize meeting the large set-up costs rather 
than incurring the additional costs of voluntary disclosure. In addition, new firms may 
encounter less pressure from stakeholders for voluntary disclosure compared to older ones.  
Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relation between firms' age and voluntary disclosure. 
 
Firm Profitability 
The majority of disclosure studies propose a positive association between firm 
profitability and voluntary disclosure. Moreover, this proposition has been justified in each 
of the four theories' perspectives. First, agency theory argues that managers of high profit 
firms will disclose detailed information in order to win personal advantages and to justify 
the compensation package (Barako, 2007; Inchausti, 1997). Second, stakeholders theory 
suggests that high profit firms will disclose more information to satisfy all stakeholders 
(Abdel-Fattah, 2008). Third, from the political costs theory perspective, Inchausti (1997) 
argues that the management of profitable firms discloses more information in order to 
justify these higher profits. Fourth, signaling theory proposes that profitable firms will 
disclose more information in order to benefit from its success through raising the price and 
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value of their shares (Inchausti, 1997; Foster, 1986). In sum, achieving high profits is a 
main indicator of the management success. This will provide an incentive for the 
management to exploit this success in order to gain many benefits through the voluntary 
disclosure, such as strengthening its position, improving its reputation in the business 
market, and justifying compensation. Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relation between profitability and voluntary disclosure  
 
Firm Leverage 
Despite the conflicting results on the relationship between firm leverage and 
voluntary disclosure, there are several reasons that justify a positive association. First, high 
leverage levels raise the agency costs, which encourage managers to disclose more 
information in order to reduce such costs (Alves et al., 2012). Second, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that firms with high debt ratios are subject to high monitoring 
costs, and therefore, they disclose more information. Third, firms with high debt ratios tend 
to disclose more information voluntarily in order to reassure their lenders, and to prolong 
or extend the debt contract period. Fourth, firms committed to large debt contracts are 
often required to comply with certain debt restrictive covenants, and to show their 
compliance have to disclose more information than is required. Consequently, we 
hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relation between leverage and voluntary disclosure. 
 
Independent Directors 
The large ratio of independent directors to total board size confirms the 
independence of the board, and implies that monitoring results will be more effective as 
long as the directors are unbiased. Consequently, independent directors may induce the 
management to disclose more information voluntarily (Abdel-Fattah, 2008). Alves et al. 
(2012) believe in a positive correlation; however, they could not find empirical evidence to 
support their hypothesis. Nevertheless, Samaha and Dahawy (2010) and Samaha and 
Dahawy (2011) do find a positive correlation. Furthermore, Lim et al. (2007) find that 
firms with higher independent boards disclose more forward-looking and strategic 
information. However, Soliman (2013) and Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) find no 
significant correlation. In sum, this study hypothesizes a positive correlation between 
board independence and the amount of voluntary disclosure, since independent directors 
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should conduct their monitoring tasks more effectively and should ask the management for 
greater disclosure to the stakeholders. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relation between the ratio of independent directors and 
voluntary disclosure. 
 
 
Auditor Specialization 
Auditor specialization is one of the least examined variables in the context of 
voluntary disclosure; therefore, this study contributes by its inclusion. Auditor 
specialization is one of the main audit quality determinants, since specialized auditors 
should provide high quality reassurance results, which, in turn, will affect the voluntary 
disclosure effectively. Furthermore, Peters et al. (2001) document that the literature 
concludes that auditor specialization is positively correlated with disclosure quality and 
transparency. In addition, Peters et al. (2001, p.2) state, "Our evidence supports the view 
that specialized auditors are employed in order to reduce information asymmetry by 
lending credibility to firms' disclosure". Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 6: There is a positive relation between the auditor specialization and 
voluntary disclosure.  
 
Auditor Type   
Abdel-Fattah (2008, p.198) states, "It has been hypothesized that companies 
audited by an international big audit firm will disclose more information voluntarily". In 
addition, Abd-Elsalam (1999) argues that large audit firms work hard to protect their 
reputation, and they are more independent than small audit firms; therefore, they ask their 
clients to follow the mandatory disclosure rules, in addition to disclosing more information 
voluntarily. Moreover, the authors consider that since management hires the external 
auditors, if they hire one of the big-four, this reveals that the management is ready to 
disclose more information and there is no intention to conceal any information. Further, a 
firm audited by a big-four (Big 4) auditor implies that in the client acceptance phase the 
auditor has concluded, that the client is ready to disclose more information as the auditor 
requires. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 7: There is a positive relation between the auditor type and voluntary 
disclosure. 
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Family Ownership  
The family ownership variable is not included in the current study randomly. First, 
we notice that only a few studies around the world address the family ownership variable 
in the context of voluntary disclosure, e.g., Ghazwy (2010) and Chau and Gray (2002). 
Second, the Saudi market is dominated by the family firms; the Saudi industrial and 
commercial champers council highlights that 95% of firms listed on Saudi Stock Exchange 
are family firms, and that of the 100 largest firms in the Kingdom 45 are family firms. 
Practically, Ghazwy (2010) argues that the family ownership may influence positively the 
social voluntary disclosure; however, no relationship is concluded. However, this study 
argues that family firms may tend to disclose more information voluntarily, since these 
firms compete to gain a social position, create a prestige, and improve the image of their 
families. Consequently, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 8: There is a positive relation between family ownership and voluntary 
disclosure.  
 
State Ownership  
States can influence the extent and nature of voluntary disclosure through their 
ownership in companies. Juhmani (2013) believes in a positive association between state 
ownership and voluntary disclosure, since governments will require more transparency 
from the companies' management. However, he could not provide empirical evidence. 
However, Huafang and Jianguo (2007) do find a positive association. In contrast, Ghazali 
and Weetman (2006) provide empirical evidence that state-controlled firms tend to 
disclose less information to protect their political linkages and their beneficial owners. 
However, we propose a positive influence for a number of reasons. First, we expect that 
governments will be on the stakeholders' side, since governments work for the public 
interest. Second, governments want to ensure compliance with corporate governance 
principles, such as the transparency. Third, there are certain specific issues that 
governments will require the companies' management to provide greater disclosure, such 
as the social and environmental impacts. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 9: There is a positive relation between state ownership and voluntary 
disclosure. 
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Industry Type 
In general, the voluntary disclosure level is expected to differ in nature and extent 
across different sectors. For example, the Egyptian banks were found to have higher 
disclosure levels than firms in other sectors. Dahaway (2009) explains that banks, in 
general, are subject to additional disclosure requirements set by the central banks. In 
addition, due to the special nature of the financial industry, a considerable portion of 
disclosure is expected to be different in nature from other sectors. Furthermore, companies 
in harmful environmental sectors, such as the petroleum, chemical, and fertilizers 
industries, are expected to disclose voluntarily more information than companies in green 
sectors, such as the tourism sector. This is because the former companies are under 
pressure from society and environment protection bodies. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 10: There is a relation between the industry type and voluntary disclosure. 
 
4. Methodology 
 
4.1 Sample  
 
Table 1 shows that our initial sample consists of 694 firm-year observations. We 
exclude 172 observations because they belong to the financial sector. Furthermore, we 
discarded another 161 observations with missing data. Consequently, the final sample 
consists of 361 firm-year observations. All firms are listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange, 
and the data was collected from the annual reports of the sample firms available at 
"www.tadawual.com.sa". Our sample period covers years 2007-2011 and, therefore, panel 
data are used. In this regard, Christodoulou and Sarafidis (2008), among others, argue that 
panel data increase the estimation efficiency, since this data type increases the observations 
more than time-series data and cross-sectional data.  
 
Table 1: Study Firm-Year Observations 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Initial Sample 111 129 146 152 156 694 
Banks & Insurance firms 28 32 36 38 38 172 
Missing Data 42 38 34 26 21 161 
Final Sample 41 59 76 88 97 361 
 
4.2 Content Analysis and the Disclosure Index 
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We employ content analysis to examine the nature and extent of voluntary 
disclosure for two reasons. First, content analysis is prevalent in the disclosure literature 
and the results of many studies have encouraged the researchers to use its methodology 
(Alves et al, 2012). This is because of its reliability, validity, and the shortage of other 
means that can measure the disclosure extent effectively (Gray & Haslam, 1990). Second, 
unlike other methods, such as questionnaires or field studies, this analysis evaluates the 
annual reports information without the knowledge of the information communicator, which 
makes it a discrete analysis (Alves et al. 2012). In addition, content analysis can be 
computerized or manual. The computerized content analysis can save cost and time, and 
may reduce the subjectivity. However, it requires the availability of annual reports in the 
same language and in English in most cases, which is not available in many countries 
(Abdel-Fattah, 2008). Therefore, this study uses manual content analysis.  
Furthermore, we built a self-constructed disclosure index, derived from the 
literature. The process of disclosure index construction in the majority of studies follows 
four steps. The first is preparing a checklist that consists of the voluntary disclosure items. 
Therefore, we constructed a checklist consists of 54 information items classified under 10 
different categories (See Appendix A). We developed this checklist based on pioneering 
studies in this field, including Botosan (1997) and Meek et al. (1995). The second step is 
employing content analysis to analyze the actual information in the annual reports, and 
then compare them with the prepared checklist. The third step is scoring each firm for the 
number of disclosed and non-disclosed items; therefore, we adopt the Dischotomous 
procedure as it is a common evaluation method. We assign one for each firm-year 
observation if the item is disclosed and assign zero otherwise. The final step is calculating 
the disclosure index. Following Hodgdon (2004) and Cooke (1989), among others, we 
measure the ratio of disclosure index as the actual score given to a firm to the maximum 
disclosure expected. For example, if a firm in a given year discloses 20 items, then its 
actual score is 20, and the disclosure ratio = 20/54, which is 0.37. 
 
4.3 Model Specification 
 
The following ordinary least square (OLS) regression model is employed to 
examine the study hypotheses: 
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VDINDEXjt = γ 0 + γ1 LogAsstjt + γ2 LogAgejt + γ3 ROAjt + γ4 LEVRGjt + γ5 
BrdIndpejt + γ6 Audspecjt+ γ7 Big4jt+ γ8 Famownjt+ γ9 Stateownjt+ γ10 Indjt+ ε 
Table 2 summarizes the symbols, definitions, and measurements of all the study 
model variables. Moreover, most measurements of the model variables are consistent with 
previous relevant studies; specifically, the measurement of the voluntary disclosure index 
is based on Botosan (1997). 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Model Variables, Symbols, Definitions, and Measurements 
Symbol Proxy Measurement 
Dependent Variable 
VDINDEX 
Voluntary Disclosure 
Index 
Number of items actually and voluntarily disclosed by a given 
firm divided by the total number of relevant items that should 
be disclosed (Botosan, 1997) 
 
Independent Variables 
LogAsstjt Firm Size 
LogAsst is measured as natural logarithm of book value of 
total assets for the firm j and period t. 
     LogAgejt Firm Age 
Firm Age is expressed as the natural logarithm of years 
number since establishment, for the firm j and period t. 
ROAjt Firm Profitability 
ROA refers to return on assets, and is measured as the ratio of 
net income to total assets for the firm j and period t. 
LEVRGjt Firm Leverage 
LEVRG is measured as long-term debts divided by capital 
equity. 
BrdIndpejt 
Independent 
Directors 
BrdIndpe is the ratio of independent directors to total board 
size 
Audspecjt 
Auditor 
Specialization 
Audspec is a dummy variable, which equals one if the auditor 
is specialized in the client industry, zero otherwise. 
Big4jt Auditor Type 
Big4 is a dummy variable, which equals one if the auditor is 
one of the Big4, zero otherwise. 
Famownjt Family Ownership 
Famown is the ratio of shares owned by family members to 
total outstanding shares 
Stateownjt State ownership 
Stateown is the ratio of shares owned by the state to total 
outstanding shares. 
Indjt: stands for Industry Type and is divided into 5 sub-variables representing 5 different sectors: 
Indptroenrg Petrochemical Sector 
Dummy variable, one if the firm belongs to the petrochemical 
sector, zero otherwise. 
Indagr Agriculture Sector 
Dummy variable, one if the firm belongs to the agriculture 
sector, zero otherwise. 
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Indindstin-t Industrial Sector 
Dummy variable, one if the firm belongs to industrial sector, 
zero otherwise. 
Indrelstat Real Estate Sector 
Dummy variable, one if the firm belongs to the real estate 
sector, zero otherwise. 
Indtele 
Telecommunication 
Sector 
Dummy variable, one if the firm belongs to 
telecommunication sector, zero otherwise. 
 
5 Study Results & Discussion 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 3 shows the descriptive analysis, however, only the noteworthy observations 
are discussed. First, the table shows that the mean of voluntary disclosure index is 18.38, 
which indicates that only 18.38%, on average of all the disclosure index items are actually 
disclosed by the sample firms. Second, Table 3 shows that the mean of leverage is 10.50%, 
which indicates that the sample firms are not highly leveraged firms, and do not suffer debt 
problems. In addition, a minimum value of zero and a maximum value of 62.10% reveal a 
large dispersion in firms' debt ratios. Third, the board independence mean is 52.50 %, 
which implies that about half of the sample firms' directors are independent. Fourth, the 
mean of auditor specialization is 39.80%, which indicates that specialized auditors, on 
average, audit about 40% of the sample firms. Fifth, the mean of Big4 variable is 0.637, 
which asserts that a Big4 auditor audits 63.70%, on average, of the sample firms. Sixth, the 
mean of family ownership variable is 0.15, which infers that families own about 15%, on 
average, of the sample firms. In addition, the minimum value of family ownership 
variables is zero, which indicates that ownership structure of some sample firms does not 
include family ownership. In contrast, the maximum value of family ownership variable is 
0.95, which indicates that the ownership structure of some sample firms comprises of 95% 
family ownership. Finally, concerning the state ownership variable, its mean is 0.07, and 
its minimum and maximum values are zero and 0.830, respectively, which indicates that 
ownership structure rangers from 83% state ownership to zero state ownership. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Model Variables 
St.Deviation Maximum Minimum Median Mean Variable 
7.063 44.000 6.000 17.000 18.384 VD-INDEX 
0.685 11.047 7.185 9.216 9.242 LogAsst 
0.394 1.740 0.000 1.279 1.207 LogAge 
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0.094 0.386 -0.108 0.071 0.077 ROA 
0.151 0.621 0.000 0.039 0.105 LEVRG 
0.223 1.000 0.000 0.500 0.525 BrdIndpe 
0.491 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.398 Audspec 
0.481 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.637 Big4 
0.238 0.950 0.000 0.000 0.151 Famown 
0.172 0.830 0.000 0.000 0.077 Stateown 
0.336 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.129 Indptroenrg 
0.365 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.158 Indagr 
0.281 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.086 Indindstin-t 
0.375 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.169 Indrelstat 
0.233 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.057 Indtele 
 
5.2 Comparison with other Arab Countries 
 
In comparison with the voluntary disclosure magnitudes concluded by prior 
research on some Arab countries, Table 4 summarizes the rates from the current study and 
those of ten other studies across the Arab world. The table shows that the voluntary 
disclosure extent in this study is the lowest (18.38%), while the highest extent is in the 
study by Juhmani (2013) in a sample of Bahraini firms (75.76%). However, the variation 
in the voluntary disclosure level may be due to different studies' circumstances such as the 
study period, and the categories of voluntary disclosure included in the disclosure index, or 
may be because of differences in the accounting standards followed or the mandatory 
disclosure requirements among these countries. 
Table 4 Voluntary Disclosure Rates in the Arab Region 
Study Country VD- Mean Sample Years 
Current Study  Saudi Arabia 18.38% 2007-2011 
Kolsi (2012) Tunisia 26.08% 2009-2010 
Haddad et al. (2009) Jordan 28% 2004 
Aljifri (2008) UAE 30.50% 2005-2006 
Abdel-Fattah (2008) Egypt 31.19% 2003-2006 
Soliman (2013) Egypt 32% 2007-2010 
Zayoud et al. (2011) Syria 32.50% 2009 
Hossain & Hammami (2009) Qatar 37% 2008 
Al-Shammari (2008) Kuwait 46% 2007 
Hassan et al. (2009) Egypt 48% 1995-2002 
Juhmani (2013) Bahrain 75.76% 2010 
 
5.3 Correlation Matrix and Multicollinearity Analysis 
Table 5 shows the correlation analysis. It shows that the highest correlation 
between the independent variables is 50.70%; this is between the firm size and the Big4. 
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The next highest correlation is 48%, between the auditor specialization and the Big4. There 
is no ee Multicollinearity problem, since Bryman and Cramer (2001), among others, argue 
that the correlation between the independent variables is not harmful if it does not exceed 
0.80 or 0.90, while others document that a correlation of less than 70% does not represent a 
correlation risk.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Correlation Matrix 
 
vdindex logasst logage ROA LEVRG brdindep audspec big4 famown stateown indptr~g indagr indind~t indrel~t indtele 
vdindex 1.000               
logasst 0.408* 1.000              
logage 0.014 -0.331* 1.000             
ROA 0.109 0.028* 0.196 1.000            
LEVRG -0.153* 0.479 -0.356 -0.015 1.000           
brdindep -0.080 -0.135 0.242* -0.087 -0.094 1.000          
audspec 0.238* 0.382* -0.182* -0.088 0.155 0.053 1.000         
big4 0.200* 0.507* -0.305* 0.113 0.343 -0.230* 0.479* 1.000        
famown 0.219* 0.184* -0.271* -0.073 -0.020 -0.176* 0.124 0.264* 1.000       
stateown 0.319* 0.408* 0.141 0.367* -0.015 -0.042 0.100 0.194* -0.201* 1.000      
indptroenrg -0.071 0.144* -0.134 -0.182 0.391 0.102 0.323* 0.199* -0.195* -0.113 1.000     
indagr 0.107 -0.247* 0.158* -0.106 -0.143 0.019 -0.290* -0.219* 0.111 -0.203* -0.206* 1.000    
indindstin~t -0.180 0.036 -0.190* -0.015 0.057* -0.036* -0.079 -0.158 0.060* -0.094 -0.126* -0.162* 1.000   
indrelstat 0.030 0.011* -0.093* -0.045 -0.123 -0.154 0.036 0.056 0.139 -0.183* -0.179* -0.231* -0.141* 1.000  
indtele 0.305* 0.459* -0.346 0.027 0.233 -0.044 0.136 0.203* -0.087 0.426* -0.095 -0.123* -0.075 -0.107* 1.000 
* Significant at 5% level 
 
5.4 Multiple Regression Results 
Table 6 summarizes the results of OLS regression analysis. It is apparent that the F-
value is 9.390 (P=0.000), which indicates that the study model is statistically significant. 
Moreover, the adjusted value of the determination coefficient (Adj.R2) = 0.445, which 
implies that the independent variables explain 45.50% of total variation in the voluntary 
disclosure index. In sum, the model is a statistically effective for explaining the variation in 
the extant of voluntary disclosure. 
Regarding the independent variables' results, Table 6 shows that the firm size is 
positively and significantly correlated with the voluntary disclosure (significance level is 
1%) which is consistent with the first hypothesis. This result is consistent with the results 
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of Soliman (2013), Abdel-Fattah (2008), Wang et al. (2008), Alsaeed (2006), Nasser et al. 
(2002), and Meek et al. (1995). This result asserts that argument of the stakeholders’ 
theory that large firms are more likely to provide more voluntary disclosure, since these 
firms are under greater pressure from the large number of stakeholders following the large 
firms. 
The table also shows that firm age is positively and statistically correlated with the 
voluntary disclosure (significance level is 10%). This finding confirms the argument that 
the older firms have the incentives, resources, and expertise to organize and disseminate 
more information than do younger firms. Moreover, this argument agrees with that of 
Soliman (2013), and with the results of Hossain and Hammami (2009).  
Moreover, the analysis shows that firm profitability is positively correlated with the 
voluntary disclosure and statistically significant at 5%, which consistent with the third 
hypothesis. This result asserts the arguments of agency and political costs theories that 
managers of high profit firms will disclose more information to gain personal interests, 
such as creating a good reputation, and to justify the compensation package (Barako, 2007; 
Inchausti, 1997). Further, the result asserts the signaling theory argument that profitable 
firms disclose more information to raise their price and value of their shares (Inchausti, 
1997; Foster, 1986). This result is consistent with Wang et al. (2008) and Samaha and 
Dahawy (2011), among others, who argue that higher profits induce managers to supply 
more information to signal quality. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the firm leverage 
is negatively and significantly correlated with voluntary disclosure (significance level is 
1%). This contradicts the agency theory argument that leveraged firms are more likely to 
disclose more information to reduce the increased agency costs created because of high 
debts (Alves et al. 2012). This also contradicts the authors’ expectations that highly 
leveraged firms are more likely to disclose more information voluntarily in order to 
reassure their lenders that business is stable, renew the existing debts, and signal that they 
are able to repay the debts whenever due.  
We also find an insignificant negative correlation between independent directors' 
ratio and voluntary disclosure, which inconsistent with our fifth hypothesis that firms with 
high ratio of independent directors are more likely to disclose more information. This 
result contradicts that of Samaha and Dahawy (2011) who find a positive correlation. This 
result also is inconsistent with the agency theory argument that board independence is an 
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effective corporate governance mechanism that could increase and improve the voluntary 
disclosure.  
In terms of the quality of auditing environment, we find a positive and significant 
correlation between auditor specialization and voluntary disclosure (significance level is 
10%). This result is consistent with the sixth hypothesis and the argument of Peters et al. 
(2001) that firms audited by specialized auditors improve the audit quality, which in turn, 
increases the level of voluntary disclosure. However, we find negative and insignificant 
correlation between auditor type and the voluntary disclosure. This result conflicts with 
arguments of Abdel-Fattah (2008) and Abd-Elsalam (1999) and the current study’s 
hypothesis that firms audited by one of the Big4 auditors tend to disclose more information 
voluntarily, since a Big4 auditor attempts to guard its reputation and supports stakeholder 
through extra disclosure. However, this result is consistent with that of Soliman (2013), 
Samaha and Dahawy (2011), and Alsaeed (2006).  
In terms of ownership structure, on one hand, we find a positive and significant 
correlation between family ownership and voluntary disclosure (significance level is 5%). 
This result confirms the current study's argument that family firms tend to disclose more 
information, since the families wish to improve their families’ image and position and to 
create prestige within the community. Although, Ghazwy (2010) proposed a positive 
correlation between the family ownership and voluntary disclosure extent, but his results 
did not confirm his expectation. On the other hand, we did not find significant correlation 
between state ownership and the voluntary disclosure extent. This result contradicts the 
study expectations, and those of Juhmani (2013) and Huafang and Jianguo (2007) that the 
state-controlled firms tend to disclose more information to show their compliance with 
corporate governance principles, such as transparency. However, this result is congruent 
with that of Samaha and Dahawy (2011) who find no significant correlation between state 
ownership and voluntary disclosure.  
Finally, looking at the industry type, the results show that petrochemicals sector is 
positively correlated with voluntary disclosure, and statistically significant at 5%, and both 
the agriculture sector and telecommunication sector are positively correlated with the 
voluntary disclosure extent, and statistically significant at 1%. This positive correlation can 
be justified, since the activities of petroleum and agricultural firms are more likely to 
negatively influence society and the environment through the diffusion of polluting 
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substances. In addition, telecommunication firms potentially affect society negatively 
through the harmful radiation; therefore, these firms tend to disclose more information, 
particularly social information, to reassure the population and social organizations that they 
comply with society and environment protection rules. However, the results show no 
significant correlation for firms in the industrial or real estate sectors.  
In sum, the regression results provide evidence that firm size, firm age, firm 
profitability, auditor specialization, family ownership, and industry type affect positively 
voluntary disclosure. However, only firms' leverage was found to negatively affect 
voluntary disclosure, while no significant correlation was found between independent 
directors' ratio, auditor type, and state ownership and voluntary disclosure.  
 
 
Table 6: Regression Results 
Symbol Explanatory Variable Coef. t-value Sig. Pred.Sig
n 
Result 
_cons  -29.832 -3.660 0.000        -----  
LogAsst Firm Size 4.839 5.360 0.000***      +  Accept 
LogAge Firm Age 2.552 1.720 0.088*          + Accept 
ROA Firm Profitability 9.201 2.230 0.027**           + Accept 
LEVRG Firm Leverage -16.870 -5.860 0.000***     + Reject 
Brdindep Independent Directors -1.809 -1.140 0.255            + Reject 
Audspec Auditor Specialization 1.839 1.920 0.056*         + Accept 
Big4 Auditor Type -0.778 -0.740 0.463           + Reject 
Famown Family Ownership 5.179 2.080 0.039**        + Accept 
Stateown State Ownership 1.961 0.470 0.640            + Reject 
Indptroenrg Petrochemicals Sector 2.957 2.080 0.039**         +/- Accept 
Indagr Agricultural Sector 4.005 3.230 0.002***       +/- Accept 
Indindstin~t Industrial Sector -1.599 -1.430 0.154            +/- Reject 
Indrelstat Real Estate Sector 1.163 0.830 0.407            +/- Reject 
Indtele Telecommunication Sector 7.486 2.590 0.011***      +/- Accept 
 
 
   
  
F-value 9.390 
*      Significant at 1%, 
**    Significant at 5%, and 
*** Significant at 10%. 
Prob > F 0.000 
R-squared .463 
Adj. R2 .445 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
This study investigates the determinants of voluntary disclosure in Saudi Arabia in 
the period 2007-2011 by analyzing the panel data of 361 firm-year observations using both 
content analysis and OLS regression analysis. Moreover, following Botosan (1997) a 
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voluntary disclosure index consisting of 54 primary voluntary disclosure items was 
constructed to measure level of disclosure. Our descriptive analysis shows that voluntary 
disclosure extent, on average, is 18.38%, which is the lowest recorded when compared 
with the other rates in the Arab region; these range from 26.08% in Tunisia as found by 
Kolsi (2012), to 75.76% in Bahrain by Juhmani (2013). This low rate in Saudi Arabia is 
not commensurate with the size and influence of the Saudi Arabia economy. The results 
also provide evidence on the positive significant association between firm size, firm age, 
firm profitability, auditor specialization, family ownership, and industry type, and the 
voluntary disclosure extent. This result implies that these variables are the main voluntary 
disclosure drivers in Saudi Arabia. However, a negative significant association was found 
between firm leverage and voluntary disclosure, while no significant association was found 
between board independence, Big 4, and state ownership, and the voluntary disclosure 
extent. 
Nevertheless, this study has a number of limitations. First, due to data availability, 
we limit our analysis to ten potential determinants of disclosure. Second, the firm-year 
observations examined are only 361 and the study period is only 5 years, which are small, 
relative to the size and age of the Saudi Capital Market.   
Our study suggests a number of other avenues for future research.  It would be 
interesting to study the tone of voluntary disclosure in annual reports and to explore the 
extent to which tone disclosure affects the stock market participants in emerging 
economies. In addition, Said Ressas and Hussainey (2014) provide evidence that financial 
crisis affect the tone of disclosure in annual reports. It might be interesting to examine the 
impact of financial crisis on the disclosure practice in emerging economies. Finally, it 
would be interesting to extend the present study by looking at the determinants of 
individual classes of information in emerging economies (i.e. forward-looking 
disclosure).This research idea has been extensively explored in developed economy (i.e. 
Abed et al, 2014); however, there has been little evidence on the determinants of individual 
classes of information in emerging economies. 
24 
 
References 
Abdel-Fattah, T.M.H. (2008), "Voluntary disclosure practices in emerging capital 
markets: the case of Egypt", PhD Thesis, Durham University, United Kingdom. 
Available at: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1342/ 
Abd-Elsalam, O. (1999), "The introduction and application of international accounting 
standards to accounting disclosure regulation of a capital market in a developing 
country: the case of Egypt", PhD Thesis, Herriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, UK. 
Abed, S., Roberts, C. & Hussainey, K. (2014). 'Managers' incentives for issuing cash 
flow forecasts'. International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance 
Evaluation, 10 (2): 133-152.  
Albassam, W. M. (2014), “Corporate governance, voluntary disclosure and financial 
performance: an empirical analysis of Saudi listed firms using mixed-methods of 
research design”, PhD Thesis. University of Glasgow, United Kingdom. Available 
at:  http://theses.gla.ac.uk/5280/ 
Al-Janadi, Y., Rahman, R.A., & Omar, N.H. (2013), "Corporate governance 
mechanisms and voluntary disclosure in Saudi Arabia", Research Journal of Finance & 
Accounting, vol. 4, issue.4, pp. 25-36. 
Aljifri, K. (2008), "Annual report disclosure in a developing country: the case of UAE", 
Advances in Accounting, vol. 24, pp. 93-100. 
Alsaeed, Kh. (2006), "The association between firm-specific characteristics and 
disclosure: the case of Saudi Arabia", The Journal of American Academy of 
Business, vol.7, issue. 1, pp. 310-321. 
Al-Shammari, B. (2008), "Voluntary disclosure in Kuwait corporate annual reports", 
Review of Business Research, vol.1, issue. 10-30. 
Al-Shammari, B., & Al-Sultan, W. (2010),"Corporate governance and voluntary 
disclosure in Kuwait", International Journal of Disclosure & Governance, vol. 7, 
pp. 262-280. 
Alshehri, A., & Solomon. J. (2012), “The evolution of corporate governance in Saudi 
Arabia”, Conference Paper, British Accounting and Finance Association (BAFA), 
Brighton, UK.  
Alves, H., Rodrigues, A.M., & Canadas, N. (2012),"Factors influencing the different 
categories of voluntary disclosure in annual reports: an analysis for Iberian 
Peninsula listed companies", Review of Applied Management Studies Journal, vol. 
10, pp. 15-26. 
Haddad, A.E., Wasim, K. A. & Nobanee, H. (2009), “Voluntary disclosure and stock 
market liquidity: evidence from the Jordanian capital market”, International 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Performance Evaluations (IJAAPE), vol. 5, 
No. 3, pp. 285-309.  
Baker, H.K., & Haslem, J.A. (1973), "Informational needs of individual investors", The 
Journal of Accountancy, vol. 136, issue.5, pp. 64-69. 
Barako, D.G. (2007), "Determinants of voluntary disclosure in Kenyan companies 
annual reports", African Journal of Business Management, vol. 1, issue. 5, pp. 113-
128. 
Baydoun, N., Maguire, W., Ryan, N., & Willett, R. (2013), “Corporate governance in 
five Arabian Gulf countries”, Managerial Auditing Journal. Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 7-
22 
25 
 
Bazine, E., & Vural, D. (2011),"Voluntary Disclosure of financial targets: empirical 
evidence from manufacturing firms listed on Stockholm Stock Exchange during 
2001 to 2009", School of Business, Economics & Law, Gothenburg University, 
Available at: https://gupea.ub.gu.se/handle/2077/26852  
Botosan, Ch. A. (1997), "Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital", The 
Accounting Review, vol. 72, issue. 3, pp. 323-349. 
Brammer, S., & Pavelin, S. (2006), "Voluntary environmental disclosure by large UK 
companies", Journal of Business, Finance, & Accounting, vol. 33, issue. 7, pp. 
1168-1188. 
Bryman, A., & Cramer, D. (2001), Quantitative data analysis with SPSS release 10 for 
windows: A guide for social scientists (1st edition), United Kingdom, London, 
Routledge.  
Camfferman, K. & Cooke. T. E. (2002), "An analysis of disclosure in the annual reports 
of UK and Dutch companies", Journal of International Accounting Research, vol. 
1, issue. 1, pp. 3-30. 
Chau, G., & Gray, S.J. (2002),"Ownership structure & corporate voluntary disclosure in 
Hong Kong and Singapore", The International Journal of Accounting, vol. 37, 
issue. 2, pp. 247-265. 
Chow, C., & Wong-Boren, A. (1987), "Voluntary financial disclosure by Mexican 
corporations", The Accounting Review, vol. 62, issue. 3, pp. 533-541. 
Christodoulou, D. & Sarafidis, V. (2008), "The econometrics of estimating expected 
accruals", Working paper, University of Sydney, Australia. 
Cooke, T. (1989), "Voluntary corporate disclosure by Swedish companies", Accounting 
& Business Research, vol. 19, pp.113-124. 
Dahawy, K. (2009), "Company characteristics and disclosure level: The Egyptian 
story", International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, vol. 34, 
December, pp. 194-208. 
Elshalahy, B.M. (2012),"Determination of the nature of voluntary disclosure of  human 
resources in the financial reports of Kuwaiti Industrial public shareholding 
companies", Master Thesis, Middle East University, Jordan.  
Foster, G. (1986), Financial statement analysis, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice-Hall. 
Ghazali, N., & Weetman, P. (2006), "Perpetuating traditional influences: voluntary 
disclosure in Malaysia following the economic crisis", Journal of International 
Accounting, Auditing, and Taxation, vol. 15, pp. 226-248. 
Ghazwy, H. A. (2010), "Impact of corporate governance on the accounting information 
disclosure extent: An empirical study on corporations in the Saudi Arabia", Master 
thesis, Faculty of Management & Economics, The Arab Academy in Denmark.  
Guthrie, J., Petty, R., Yongcanich, K., & Ricceri, F. (2004), "Using content analysis as a 
research method to inquire into intellectual capital reporting", Journal of 
Intellectual Capital, vol. 5, issue. 2, pp. 282-293. 
Hassan, O.A.G., Giorgioni, G., & Romilly, P. (2006), “The extent of financial 
disclosure and its determinants in an emerging capital market: the case of Egypt”, 
International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation 
(IJAAPE), vol. 3, issue. 1, pp. 41-67. 
Hassan, O.A.G., Romilly, P., Giorgioni, G., & Power, D. (2009), "The value relevance 
of disclosure: evidence from the emerging capital market of Egypt", The 
International Journal of Accounting, vol.44, pp. 79-102.  
26 
 
Hodgdon, D. (2004), "An empirical examination of the effect of firm compliance with 
the disclosure requirements of international accounting standards on the 
characteristics of analysts' earnings forecasts", PhD dissertation, Virginia 
Commonwealth University. 
Hossain, M. (2008), "The extent of disclosure in annual reports of banking companies: 
the case of India", European Journal of Scientific Research, vol. 23, issue. 4, pp. 
660-681. 
Hossain, M. & Hammami, H. (2009), "Voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of an 
emerging country: the case of Qatar", Advances in international accounting, vol. 
25, pp. 255-265. 
Hossain, M., Tan, M., & Adams, M. (1994), "Voluntary disclosure in an emerging 
capital market: some empirical evidence from companies listed on the KLSE", The 
International Journal of Accounting, vol. 29, issue. 4, pp. 334-351. 
Htay, Sh. N.N. (2012), "The impact of corporate governance on the voluntary 
accounting information disclosure in Malaysian listed banks", Global Review of 
Accounting & Finance, vol. 3, issue. 2, pp. 128-142. 
Huafang, X., & Jianguo, Y. (2007), "Ownership structure, board composition and 
corporate voluntary disclosure: evidence from listed companies in China", 
Managerial Auditing Journal, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 604-619. 
Inchausti, B.G. (1997), "The influence of company characteristics and accounting 
regulation on information disclosed by Spanish firms", The European Accounting 
Review", Vol. 6, issue.1, pp. 45-68. 
Jensen, M. & Meckling, W. (1976), "Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency 
costs and ownership structure", Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 3, pp. 305-
360. 
Juhmani, O. (2013),"Ownership structure and corporate voluntary disclosure: evidence 
from Bahrain", International journal of accounting & financial reporting, vol. 3, 
issue.2, pp. 133-148. 
Kolsi, M.Ch. (2012), "The determinants of corporate voluntary disclosure: evidence 
from the Tunisian capital market", The IUP Journal of Accounting Research & 
Audit Practices, Vol. XI, issue. 4, pp. 49-68, October. 
Lambert, RA. (2001), "Contracting theory & accounting", Journal of Accounting & 
Economics, vol. 32, issue. 1-3, pp. 3-87. 
Lev, B. (1989). ‘On the usefulness of earnings: lessons and directions from two decades 
of empirical research’. Journal of Accounting Research, 27 (Supplement): 153–92. 
Lim, S., Matolcsy, Z., & Chow, D. (2007), "The association between board composition 
and different types of voluntary disclosure", European Accounting Review, vol.16, 
issue. 3, pp. 555-583. 
Mariq, S.M. (2009), "An assessment of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
Saudi joint stock companies", Journal of Economics & Management, King 
Abdulaziz University, Vol.23, pp. 131-174. 
Meek, G.K., Roberts, C.B., & Gray, S.J. (1995),"Factors influencing voluntary annual 
report disclosures by U.S, U.K, and continental European Multinational 
corporation", Journal of International Business Studies, vol. 26, issue. 3, pp. 555-
572. 
Morris, R.D. (1987), "Signaling agency theory & accounting policy choice", Accounting 
& Business Research Journal, Winter, pp. 47-56. 
27 
 
Nasser, K., Alkhatib, K., & Karbhari, Y. (2002), "Empirical evidence on the depth of 
corporate information disclosure in developing countries: the case of Jordan", 
International Journal of Commerce & Management, vol. 12, issue. 3/4, pp. 122-
134. 
Owusu-Ansah, S. (1998). "The impact of corporate attributes on the extent of 
mandatory disclosure and reporting by listed companies in Zimbabwe", The 
International Journal of Accounting, vol. 33, issue. 5, pp. 605-631. 
Peters, G.F., Abbott, L.J., & Parker, S. (2001).,"Voluntary disclosure and auditor 
specialization: the case of commodity derivative disclosures", Western Regional 
Association Meeting, San, Jose, C.A. Available at: 
http://aaahq.org/audit/midyear/01midyear/papers/discloseParker.pdf 
Rizk, R. (2006), "Corporate social and environmental disclosure practices: an 
international comparison of UK, India, and Egyptian Corporation", PhD thesis, 
Durham University, United Kingdom. Available at: 
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1807/1/1807.pdf 
ROSC (2009). Report on the Observation of Standards and Codes (ROSC), Corporate 
Governance Country Assessment, World Bank, Washington, US. 
Ross, S. (1977), "The determination of financial structure: the incentives-signalling 
approach", Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 8, issue. 1, pp. 23-40. 
Said Ressas, M. and Hussainey, K. (2014) ‘Does financial crisis affect financial 
reporting of good news and bad news?’, International Journal of Accounting, 
Auditing, and Performance Evaluation (IJAAPE),, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp.410–429. 
Samaha, K., & Dahawy, K. (2010), “Factors influencing corporate disclosure 
transparency in the active share trading firm, an explanatory study", Research in 
Accounting in Emerging Economics, vol. 10, pp. 87-112. 
Samaha, K., & Dahawy, K. (2011), “An empirical analysis of corporate governance 
structures and voluntary corporate disclosure in volatile capital markets: the 
Egyptian experience”, International Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and 
Performance Evaluation (IJAAPE), vol. 7, No 1-2, pp. 61-93. 
Sehar, N. UI., Bilal., & Tufail, S. (2013), "Determinants of voluntary disclosure in 
annual reports: a case study of Pakistan", Management & Administrative Sciences 
Review, vol. 2, issue. 2, pp. 181-195. 
Soliman, M.M. (2013), "Firm Characteristics and the extent of voluntary disclosure: the 
case of Egypt", Research Journal of Finance & Accounting, vol. 4, issue. 17, pp. 
71-81.  
Uyar, A., Kilic, M., & Bayyurt, N. (2013), "Association between firm characteristics 
and corporate voluntary disclosure: Evidence from Turkish listed companies", 
Intangible Capital Journal, vol. 9, issue.4, pp. 1080-1012. Available at: 
Http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/ic.439 
Wallace, R. (1988), "Intranational and international consensus on the importance of 
disclosure items in financial reports: a Nigerian case study", The British Accounting 
Review, vol. 20, issue. 3, pp. 223-265.  
Wang, K., Sewon, C., & Claibone, M.C. (2008), "Determinants and consequences of 
voluntary disclosure in an emerging market: evidence from China", International 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Taxation, vol. 17, issue. 1, pp. 14-30. 
Watson, A., Shrives, P., & Marston, C. (2002),"Voluntary disclosure of accounting 
ratios in the UK", The British Accounting Review, vol.34, issue. 4, pp. 289-313. 
28 
 
Watts, R., & Zimmerman, J. (1990), "Positive Accounting theory: a ten year 
perspective, The Accounting Review, vol. 65, pp. 131-157. 
Zayoud, K., Al-Othman, M., & Issa, R.A. (2011), "Voluntary disclosure level in the 
annual reports of the Syrian Joint Stock companies listed on Damascus securities 
exchange", Tishreen University Journal for Research & Scientific Studies-
Economics - legal sciences series, vol. 33, issue.3, pp. 27-44. 
Zourarakis, N.S. (2009), "Voluntary disclosure: evidence from UK", Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, School of Management, United Kingdom. 
29 
 
Appendix A: Checklist of Voluntary Disclosure Items 
Category A:- General Company Information: 
1- Brief narrative history of the company 
2- Basic organization structure/chart/description of corporate structure 
3- General description of business activities 
4- Date of establishment 
5- Web-address of the company/email address 
Category B: Corporate Strategy: 
6- Management’s objectives and strategies/corporate vision/motto/statement of 
corporate goals or objectives 7- Future strategy – information on future expansion(capital expenditures)/general 
development of business Category C: Financial Performance: 
8- Brief discussion and analysis of a company’s financial position 
9- Qualitative forecast of earnings 
10- Return on equity 
11- Cost-to-income ratio 
12- Earnings per share 
13- Debt-to-equity ratio 
14- Dividend per share 
Category D: Accounting Policy Review: 
15- Discussion on accounting policy 
16- Disclosure of accounting standards uses for its accounts 
Category E:- Key Non-Financial Statistics: 
17- List of top five shareholders of the company 
18- Chairman’s/MD’s report 
19- Graphical presentation of performance indicators 
20- Performance at a glance – 3 year 
21- Effects of foreign currency fluctuations  
22- Effects of inflation  
23- Information about risk management 
Category F: Corporate Social Disclosure : 
24- Sponsoring public health, sporting or recreational projects 
25- Information on donations to charitable organizations 
26- Supporting national pride/government.-sponsored campaigns 
27- Number of CSR programs 
28- Have their own community program 
Category G: Human Resources: 
29- Health & safety of employees 
30- Number of employees  
31- Employee training  
32- Incentives level  
33- Employment of disabled  
34- Other services to employees  
35- Human rights  
36- Child labor 
37- Offering internship program  
38- Scholarships  
39- Contribution in talent development  
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40- Women empowerment 
Category H: Community Involvement 
41- Donations to community  
42- Public welfare  
43- Other activities  
44- Contribution to the national sports 
45- Work to reduce unemployment problem  
Category I: Environmental Issues: 
46- Environment expenditure  
47- Pollution abatement  
48- Environment preservation  
49- Recycling programs 
Category J: Corporate Governance Information: 
50- Directors’ engagement/directorship of other companies 
51- Picture of all directors/board of directors 
52- Details about directors (other than name/title)/ background 
directors/academic/professional/ business experience 53- Number of shares held by directors 
54- List of senior managers (not on the board of directors)/ senior management 
structure  
 
